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THE SAME NEPA PROPOSAL OR 
CONNECTED NEPA ACTIONS?: WHY THE 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT’S NEW 
OIL SHALE RULES AND REGULATIONS 
SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
Alexander Hood* 
Abstract: In November 2008, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
finalized a rule opening public land in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming for 
oil shale leasing and finalized regulations creating policies and proce-
dures for that leasing. The rule and regulations are the BLM’s attempt to 
fulfill their mandate under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to create a 
commercial oil shale leasing program in the western United States.  As 
federal actions significantly affecting the environment, both the rule and 
regulations, are subject to the procedural requirements of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The purpose of this Note is to point to 
two possible errors by the BLM in fulfilling NEPA’s procedural require-
ments. These procedural errors are fodder for citizen-plaintiffs hoping to 
have the Bush-era rule and regulations judicially set aside and subse-
quently abandoned by the Obama Administration. 
Introduction 
 On November 17, 2008 the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
finalized a rule making public land in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming 
available for commercial oil shale leasing through the amendment of 
twelve resource management plans.1 The next day, the BLM finalized 
regulations creating policies and procedures for leasing that land for 
                                                                                                                      
* Solicitations Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2009–
2010. 
1 See Notice of Availability of Approved Resource Management Plan Amendments/Re- 
cord of Decision (ROD) for Oil Shale and Tar Sands Resources, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,519, 72,519–
20 (Nov. 28, 2008); Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Approved Re-
source Management Plan Amendments/Record of Decision (ROD) for Oil Shale and 
Tar Sands Resources to Address Land Use Allocations in Colorado, Utah, and 
Wyoming and Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, at ii (2008), 
available at http://ostseis.anl.gov/documents/docs/OSTS_ROD.pdf [hereinafter ROD]. 
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commercial oil shale development.2 According to the BLM, these two 
acts fulfilled its obligation under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to create 
an oil shale leasing program on public lands (the rule) and to imple-
ment that program (the regulations).3 The late November finalization 
dates meant that both the rule and regulations became effective just 
days before Barack Obama took office as president of the United 
States.4 This made both actions part of the flurry of “midnight” rules 
and regulations finalized at the end of the Bush Administration.5 
 With one presidential administration creating a midnight rule or 
regulation and another administration left to enforce it, midnight rules 
and regulations are especially vulnerable to judicial attack. Having rules 
or regulations set aside in the middle of a presidential administration is 
little more than a delay tactic: with time, the administration can correct 
the procedural deficiency and reinstate the rule or regulation.6 How-
ever, absent an outside judicial challenge, an incoming administration 
is forced to justify rescinding or revising a previous administration’s 
midnight rule or regulations through the time-consuming administra-
tive process. Faced with the prospect of the administrative process, in-
coming administrations will often leave midnight rules or regulations 
intact or become hopelessly bogged down in the process of rescinding 
them.7 However, if an incoming administration disagrees with a mid-
night rule or regulation, it will likely not reinstate it if it is judicially at-
tacked by a third party and set aside.8 Thus, unlike a rule or regulation 
                                                                                                                      
2 Rules and Regulations: Oil Shale Management—General, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,414, 
69,487 (Nov. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3900). 
3 See Rules and Regulations: Oil Shale Management—General, 73 Fed. Reg. at 69,414; 
ROD, supra note 1, at 2. 
4 The Congressional Review Act mandates that a “major rule” can become effective no 
earlier than sixty days after the rule’s record of decision. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(3)(A) (2006). 
The rule was executed on January 16, 2009 and the regulations were executed on January 
17, 2009. See id. Barack Obama took office on January 20, 2009. Carl Hulse, Obama Is Sworn 
in as the 44th President, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/ 
01/21/us/politics/20web-inaug2.html?hp. 
5 See Jack M. Beermann, Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 352, 352 
(2009). 
6 William F. Fox, Jr., Understanding Administrative Law § 12.01 (4th ed. 2000). 
7 Beermann, supra note 5, at 361. The Bush Administration’s experience with the Clin-
ton administration’s midnight “roadless rule” would be an example of the difficulty an 
incoming administration could have rescinding a midnight regulation; first choosing not 
to defend the rule and then unsuccessfully trying to amend the rule in 2005, the Bush 
Administration spent considerable time over its two terms attempting to rescind or erode 
the midnight rule. See Martin Nie, The Governance of Western Public Lands 96–103 
(2008). 
8 See Beermann, supra note 5, at 361 (discussing desire, but inability, to rescind a rule 
promulgated by the Carter Administration); see also Nie, supra note 7, at 97 (noting that in 
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promulgated in the middle of a presidential term, finding a procedural 
deficiency can lead to midnight rules and regulations being perma-
nently set aside. 
 The identification of a procedural deficiency in the midnight oil 
shale rule and regulations presents just such an opportunity. If a pro-
cedural deficiency can be found, the rule, regulations, or both could be 
set aside. Further, the Obama Administration’s dislike for the rule and 
regulations makes it appear likely that the rule and regulations would 
not be reinstated if judicially set aside. The Administration has been 
explicit in its distaste for the rule and regulations; Ken Salazar, the cur-
rent Interior Secretary who oversees the BLM, described the Bush Ad-
ministration’s oil shale rule and regulations as “a frenzied attempt to 
move a failed agenda.”9 Moreover, Secretary Salazar believes that the 
Bush Administration “put the cart before the horse” by moving forward 
with commercial oil shale leasing without fully understanding the envi-
ronmental impacts or whether oil shale is economically viable.10 
 The purpose of this Note is to point out a procedural deficiency 
that could set aside both the oil shale rule amending the twelve re-
source management plans to allow for commercial oil shale leasing and 
the regulations creating a procedure for that leasing. The procedural 
deficiency discussed is the BLM’s failure to include both the rule and 
the regulations in the same National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
statement.11 NEPA requires the preparation of a statement for all “ma-
jor Federal actions significantly affecting” the environment.12 In spe-
cific circumstances, NEPA requires a combined statement for multiple 
federal actions.13 The BLM prepared a separate statement for both the 
rule and the regulations, but it did not prepare a combined state-
ment.14 
                                                                                                                      
some instances the Bush Administration would simply not defend judicial challenges to 
Clinton’s midnight rules in order to hasten the judicial process). 
9 Ken Salazar, Editorial, Heedless Rush to Oil Shale, Wash. Post, July 15, 2008, at A19. 
10 See id. 
11 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C §§ 4321–4370 (2006) [herinafter 
NEPA]. 
12 See id. § 4332(C); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976). 
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); Kleppe 427 U.S. at 409. 
14 Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Proposed Oil Shale and Tar 
Sands Resource Management Plan Amendments to Address Land Use Allocations in 
Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming and Final Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement (2008) [hereinafter PEIS], available at http://ostseis.anl.gov/eis/guide/index. 
cfm; Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Environmental Assessment, 
WO-300-07-009, Final Rule, Oil Shale Management (2008) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 
3900, 3910, 3920, 3930) (on file with author) [hereinafter, EA]. 
194 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 37:191 
 This Note will argue that the BLM should have prepared a com-
bined statement; therefore, the rule and the regulations should be set 
aside for failing NEPA’s requirements.15 The argument will proceed in 
six parts. Part I contains a discussion of what oil shale is and the poten-
tial impacts of a commercial oil shale leasing program.16 Part II of this 
Note discusses the Energy Policy Act of 2005’s requirements for the 
BLM’s creation of a commercial oil shale leasing program.17 Parts III 
and IV discuss NEPA generally and the specific provisions of NEPA that 
could require a combined NEPA statement for the oil shale rule and 
regulations.18 Part V examines how the BLM fulfilled its requirements 
under the Energy Policy Act of 2005.19 Part VI argues that the combina-
tion of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and NEPA require a combined 
NEPA statement.20 
I. Oil Shale and Its Impacts 
 The current Interior Secretary, Ken Salazar, is opposed to the oil 
shale rule and regulations because of the economic uncertainties sur-
rounding the technology for turning oil shale into liquid oil and the 
potential environmental and socioeconomic impacts of a commercial 
oil shale program.21 At first blush, oil shale development seems tempt-
ing because of the potential for creating a vast domestic oil source. Ex-
perts estimate that the Green River Basin—the largest known oil shale 
deposit in the world, located where the borders of Colorado, Utah, and 
Wyoming meet—contains 500–1100 billion barrels of potentially recov-
erable oil.22 To put these numbers in perspective, the midpoint of that 
estimation—800 billion barrels—is more than triple the known oil re-
serves of Saudi Arabia.23 At current demand for oil, this would be 
enough to satisfy the oil demand of the United States for 100 years.24 
Moreover, the political excitement over oil shale also stems from the 
government’s role in developing the resource; more than 80% of the 
                                                                                                                      
15 See infra Part VI. 
16 See infra Part I. 
17 See infra Part II. 
18 See infra Parts III–IV. 
19 See infra Part V. 
20 See infra Part VI. 
21 See Salazar, supra note 9. 
22 James T. Bartis et al., Oil Shale Development in the United States: Pros-
pects and Policy Issues, at ix (2005). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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Green River Basin oil shale is located on United States’ public land 
administered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).25 
 However, the excitement surrounding these numbers should be 
tempered by a simple fact: oil shale is not oil. Rather, it is a solid com-
pound which contains an organic substance known as kerogen that can 
be extracted and further refined into oil.26 The cost of this energy-
intensive process, coupled with a potential oil shale leasing program’s 
effects on the Green River Basin’s environment, water resources, and 
socioeconomics, should create reservations about pursuing the devel-
opment of this extensive resource.27 
A. The Economics: Oil Shale Makes Expensive Oil 
 Converting solid oil shale into liquid oil is much more expensive 
than recovering conventional liquid oil.28 The economics of recovering 
oil from oil shale depend on what method is used to extract the kero-
gen from the shale.29 There are two general methods for extracting 
kerogen: conventional mining combined with surface retorting and in 
situ—or in-ground—mining.30 
 Conventional mining combined with surface retorting is the more 
expensive, but proven, method for extracting kerogen.31 This method 
involves the removal of solid shale from the ground and then the heat-
ing of the solid shale in a furnace-like retort to over 900 degrees Fahr-
enheit, turning the kerogen to gas and separating it from the solid 
shale.32 This method has proven effective at producing oil from shale at 
the commercial levels of production in the past, but its high cost hinders 
                                                                                                                      
25 James w. Bunger et al., Is Oil Shale America’s Answer to Peak-oil Challenge?, 102 Oil & 
Gas J. 16, 20 (2004). 
26 Teh Fu Yen & George V. Chilingarian, Introduction to Oil Shales, in Oil Shale: De-
velopments in Petroleum Science 5, at 1, 6–7 (Teh Fu Yen & George V. Chilingarian 
eds., 1976). 
27 Ann Boretsky et al., Choosing the Right Path for Fueling North America’s 
Transportation Future 12–14 (2007), available at http://www.nrdc.org/energy/driving 
ithome/drivingithome.pdf. 
28 Rules and Regulations: Oil Shale Management—General, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,414, 
69,421 (Nov. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3900). 
29 See Office of Petrol. Reserves—Strategic Unconventional Res., U.S. Dep’t of 
Energy, Fact Sheet: U.S. Oil Shale Economics 1, http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/ 
reserves/npr/Oil_Shale_Economics_Fact_Sheet1.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
30 Id. 
31 See Bunger et al., supra note 25, at 20. 
32 Office of Naval Petrol. & Oil Shale Reserves, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, National 
Strategic Unconventional Resources Model 8 (2006), available at http://www.fossil. 
energy.gov/programs/reserves/npr/NSURM_Documentation.pdf [hereinafter Unconven-
tional Resources Model]. 
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its wide-scale implementation.33 Currently, the cost of producing one 
barrel of oil from shale using conventional mining combined with re-
torting is between $70 and $95 per barrel.34 However, these prices could 
drop to between $35 and $48 per barrel after twelve years of experience 
with the production process.35 In comparison, the cost of producing 
one barrel of oil from conventional liquid oil resources is $19.50.36 
 In situ mining is a potentially less expensive, unproven method for 
extracting kerogen from oil shale.37 This method heats the oil shale in-
ground by turning the kerogen into a liquid or gas form and then 
pumping the kerogen to the surface.38 Avoiding expensive conventional 
mining makes the in situ method potentially more competitive with the 
$19.50 per barrel production cost of conventional liquid oil resources.39 
Experts estimate that successful implementation of in situ mining could 
result in production costs ranging from $23 to $27 per barrel.40 How-
ever, these same predictions contain the caveat that the technology is at 
least twenty years away from large-scale, commercial implementation.41 
B. Oil Shale’s Impacts: Effects on the Environment, Water Resources, and 
Regional Socioeconomics 
 A large commercial oil shale leasing program on public lands could 
affect the environment generally, create a sharp increase in demand on 
limited regional water resources, and cause socioeconomic upheaval.42 
1. Environmental Effects 
 Some environmental impacts of a commercial oil shale industry 
will be largely the same regardless of what oil shale extraction method 
is used. Common to both methods are impacts on air quality.43 The 
heating of shale—whether in-ground or above-ground—not only re-
                                                                                                                      
33 See Bartis et al., supra note 22, at 15–16. 
34 Id. at 15. 
35 Id. at 16. 
36 Rules and Regulations: Oil Shale Management—General, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,414, 
69,421 (Nov. 18, 2008). 
37 Bartis et al., supra note 22, at 17. 
38 Unconventional Resources Model, supra note 32, at 8. 
39 Rules and Regulations: Oil Shale Management—General, 73 Fed. Reg. at 69,421. 
40 Bartis et al., supra note 22, at 20. 
41 Id. at 23. 
42 Bunger et al., supra note 25, at 20−21. 
43 See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Oil Shale Environmental Fact Sheet, 1–2 http://fos- 
sil.energy.gov/programs/reserves/npr/Oil_Shale_Environmental_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Environmental Fact Sheet]. 
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leases the kerogen; it also releases sulfur oxide, nitrogen oxide, carbon 
dioxide, and particulate matter, which are all emissions regulated un-
der the Clean Air Act.44 Further, extensive energy will be necessary to 
heat the oil shale to the 900 degrees Fahrenheit necessary to release 
the kerogen from the shale.45 In the short term, this energy will have to 
come from sources that burn fossil fuels and will release significant 
quantities of greenhouse gases.46 
  The physical extraction of solid shale would have environmental 
impacts unique to that extraction method.47 First, the physical extrac-
tion of shale through conventional mining—resembling coal mining— 
could significantly disturb the surface geography.48 Commercially viable 
oil shale operations will extract approximately 25 million tons of shale 
every year, leaving a byproduct of 1.2 to 1.5 tons of spent shale for every 
barrel of oil produced.49 If the solid shale is removed through strip 
mining, the result would be some of the largest open-pit mines in the 
world.50 If developers pursued room-and-pillar mining—a method 
which leaves the surface undisturbed by hollowing out below-ground 
caverns—instead of strip mining, less surface disturbance would re-
sult.51 However, experts believe that room-and-pillar mining is subop-
timal because it results in exceptionally low levels of resource recov-
ery.52 
 Though it creates much less surface disturbance, in situ mining 
endangers ground water. Ground water coming in contact with the in-
tensely heated oil shale could be contaminated with kerogen, other 
gases, and/or sediments.53 Further, though surface disturbance would 
be less significant than with conventional mining, in situ mining would 
still require surface operations that would result in a decade-long dis-
placement at each site of other land uses as well as flora and fauna.54 
                                                                                                                      
44 See id. at 2. 
45See id. 
46 Bartis et al., supra note 22, at 40. 
47 See id. at 11–14. 
48 See id. at 12. 
49 Id. at 12, 36. 
50 Id. at 12. 
51 See id. 
52 See Bartis et al., supra note 22, at 12. 
53 Environmental Fact Sheet, supra note 43, at 2. 
54 Bartis et al., supra note 22, at 36–37. 
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2. Water Resources 
 Other than polluting water, there is also concern that commercial 
oil shale operations would place an excessive burden on the region’s 
scarce water resources.55 Much of the region proposed for commercial 
oil shale leasing lies within the Colorado River Basin, which supplies 
the water needs for much of the southwest United States and is cur-
rently strained in doing so.56 Oil shale mining and processing will add 
to this strain by requiring between 2.1 and 5.3 barrels of water per bar-
rel of oil produced.57 This water will be used for extraction, crushing, 
transport, dust control and cooling.58 Additionally, if coal is used to 
create the significant electricity necessary for heating the oil shale, 
these coal-powered electric plants will also require significant water re-
sources, thus exacerbating the problem.59 
3. Socioeconomic Impacts 
 The sparsely populated region would also experience socioeco-
nomic upheaval from the influx of investment that a commercial oil 
shale program would bring to the region.60 Oil shale production is la-
bor-intensive and therefore even a small commercial oil shale program 
could mean an influx of 40,000 to 80,000 people into the region.61 This 
influx would be absorbed by an area with a sparse population,62 and it 
will likely resemble the effects of the last oil shale boom in the region in 
the early 1980s.63 Then, the prospect of a commercial oil shale program 
introduced $85 million of payroll into the region, drastically increased 
property values, caused schools to overflow, rents to double, liquor 
stores to have empty shelves, and an increase in crime and traffic.64 
That boom ended quicker than it began when, within a week in 1982, 
Exxon mothballed its oil shale operation and left unemployment and 
                                                                                                                      
55 See id. at 50–51. 
56 PEIS, supra note 14, at 3-62 to -63. 
57 Bartis et al., supra note 22, at 50. 
58 Id. 
59 URS Corp., Energy Development Water Needs Assessment (Phase 1 Report) 3–37 
(2008), http://www.crwcd.org/media/uploads/20080925_Energy_Needs_Report.pdf. 
60 See Bunger et al., supra note 25, at 20. 
61 Bartis et al., supra note 22, at 43. 
62 Id. (noting that in 2000, Garfield County, Colorado had a population of 43,791; 
nonetheless, it is one of the most heavily populated counties in the region). 
63 See generally Andrew Gulliford, Boomtown Blues: Colorado Oil Shale 1885–
1985 (1989) (describing the booms and busts accompanying previous attempts at oil shale 
development in Colorado). 
64 Id. at 113, 119, 157. 
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economic havoc in its wake.65 The date of Exxon’s decision to close its 
oil shale operation is known by locals as “Black Sunday.”66 
II. The Energy Policy Act of 2005: Procedural and Substantive 
Requirements for the Creation of a Commercial Oil  
Shale Leasing Program 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005, a piece of comprehensive energy 
legislation, included a mandate for the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) to create a national commercial oil shale leasing program on 
public lands.67 This mandate included substantive requirements for the 
BLM’s administration of the program as well as procedural requirements 
for the BLM’s creation of the program.68 
A. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 Generally 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) is meant to reduce the 
United States’ dependence on oil from politically and economically un-
stable foreign sources in an environmentally sound manner.69 The EPAct 
is the statutory implementation of 2001 recommendations from the Na-
tional Energy Policy Development Group—a group formed by President 
George W. Bush—and led by Vice President Dick Cheney—to study ways 
to “promote dependable, affordable and environmentally sound energy 
for the future.”70 The Act includes provisions for increasing energy effi-
ciency, developing renewable energy sources, increasing production of 
domestic energy sources, increasing vehicle efficiency, and researching 
and developing new energy sources and efficiency-saving technology.71 
Included in the EPAct’s provisions for increasing domestic energy pro-
duction are substantive and procedural mandates for the Department of 
the Interior to create a commercial oil shale leasing program.72 
                                                                                                                      
65 Id. at 151–52. 
66 Bartis et al., supra note 22, at 43. 
67 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 15927 (2006) [hereinafter EPAct]. 
68 See id. 
69 See Sameh I. Mobarek, Energy Efficiency, in Energy Policy Act of 2005: Summary 
and Analysis of the Act’s Major Provisions 1, 1 (Kevin J. McIntyre et al. eds., 2006). 
70 Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, National Energy Policy, at viii (2001), avail-
able at http://www.wtrg.com/EnergyReport/National-Energy-Policy.pdf. 
71 See EPAct, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15801–16524 (2006). 
72 See id. § 15927. 
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B. The Energy Policy Act’s Substantive Requirements for a Commercial  
Oil Shale Leasing Program 
 The EPAct contains substantive requirements for the Interior Sec-
retary’s issuance of oil shale leases, restricting the near complete discre-
tion the Interior Secretary previously enjoyed under the Mineral Leas-
ing Act of 1920 (MLA).73 The only real limitations on the Secretary’s 
authority to grant a lease under the MLA were that a lessee must be an 
American citizen and that each lease be limited to one tract of 5120 
acres.74 The MLA included provisions for rental and royalty rates, but 
these had little binding effect because the Secretary was also given dis-
cretion to waive the fees to allow an oil shale operation to “successfully 
operate” or for the purpose of encouraging oil shale production.75 
 The EPAct took away some of the Interior Secretary’s discretion by 
adding three new substantive requirements for the issuance of oil shale 
leases.76 First, rather than setting royalty rates and rental fees at a level 
meant to encourage the growth of the oil shale industry, the EPAct re-
quires the Interior Secretary to ensure a “fair” rate of return to the 
United States for every lease.77 Second, regulations implemented for 
the issuance of oil shale leases now must contain work requirements 
and milestones “to ensure the diligent development of the lease.”78 Fi-
nally, the EPAct includes a consultation requirement: before a com-
mercial oil shale lease can be issued in a state, the BLM must consult 
the governor, representatives of the affected local government, “inter-
ested Indian tribes,” and “other interested persons” in that state.79 If 
the BLM finds that there is a “sufficient” level of support from these 
parties, it “may” issue commercial leases.80 This final provision could 
create a substantial roadblock for the BLM, as the governors of Colo-
rado and Wyoming do not currently support moving forward with a 
commercial oil shale leasing program.81 
                                                                                                                      
73 See Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 241 (2006); Robert W. Randall, The Changing 
Landscape for the Disposition of Federal Oil Shale Resources, Colorado Energy Research In-
stitute, 26th Oil Shale Symposium Proceedings Oct. 16, 2006, at 1, 3, http://www. 
ceri-mines.org/documents/A13c-BobRandall-paper.pdf. 
74 See 30 U.S.C. § 181; Randall, supra note 73, at 3. 
75 See Randall, supra note 73, at 3. 
76 Id. at 6–7. 
77 42 U.S.C. § 15927(o). 
78 Id. § 15927(f). 
79 Id. § 15927(e). 
80 Id. 
81 See Letter from Dave Freudenthal, Governor of Wyo., to Jim Caswell, Dir., Dep’t of Inte-
rior, Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://governor.wy.gov/press- 
 
2010] Setting Aside the BLM’s Oil Shale Rules and Regulations 201 
C. The Energy Policy Act’s Procedural Requirements for the Creation  
of a Commercial Oil Shale Leasing Program 
 The EPAct set out a three-step process for the creation of a com-
mercial leasing program for oil shale. The three steps are the issuance 
of research, development, and demonstration (RDD) leases; the crea-
tion of a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) for a 
commercial oil shale leasing program; and the publication of regula-
tions implementing a commercial oil shale leasing program.82 
 The first requirement, the issuance of RDD leases, is meant to allow 
private lessees to test known technologies and research new technolo-
gies for recovering and converting oil shale into oil.83 This goal would 
be accomplished through leasing small tracts to private entities whose 
testing results the BLM could utilize in developing the larger commer-
cial leasing program.84 
 EPAct’s second requirement for the BLM is the completion of a 
PEIS.85 This requirement is meant to ensure that the BLM considers 
the environmental impacts of the leasing program it decides to cre-
ate.86 By specifically requiring the preparation of a PEIS, Congress is 
mandating how the BLM will comply with the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA). Generally, NEPA only requires the preparation of a 
PEIS if the program is a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting 
the . . . human environment.”87 Here, the EPAct takes that determina-
tion away from the BLM by mandating the creation of a PEIS regardless 
of the agency’s determination of environmental impacts.88 Thus, in 
creating a commercial oil shale leasing program, the BLM must create 
a PEIS and that PEIS must be adequate according to NEPA.89 
 The EPAct’s final requirement for the BLM in creating a commer-
cial oil shale leasing program is the promulgation of oil shale leasing 
regulations within six months of the completion of the PEIS.90 Prior to 
the EPAct, the BLM had the authority through the MLA to issue oil 
                                                                                                                      
releases/governor-urges-caution-in-oil-shale-development-.html; Letter from Bill Ritter, Gover-
nor of Colo., to James L. Caswell, Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Sept. 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/GovRitter/GOVR/1222166168078. 
82 42 U.S.C. § 15927(c)–(d). 
83 Id. § 15927(c). 
84 See id. 
85 Id. § 15927(d)(1). 
86 See NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2006); EPAct, 42 U.S.C. § 15927(d)(1). 
87 See NEPA. 42. U.S.C. § 4332(c). 
88 See EPAct, 42 U.S.C. § 15927(d)(1). 
89 See NEPA 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c), EPAct 42 U.S.C. § 15927(d)(1). 
90 See EPAct § 15927(d)(2). 
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shale leases, but it had never promulgated regulations outlining the 
procedure for the leasing process.91 The purpose of the regulation re-
quirement is to create such uniform procedures for the BLM’s issuance 
of oil shale leases, and its management of oil shale exploration, devel-
opment, and production activities.92 
III. The National Environmental Policy Act Generally 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005’s (EPAct’s) procedural requirements 
for the creation of a commercial oil shale leasing program incorporates 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).93 They do so specifically 
by requiring the preparation of a programmatic environmental impact 
statement (PEIS), and generally by mandating agency action that may 
trigger NEPA by “significantly affecting” the environment.94 Under-
standing the implications of incorporating NEPA into EPAct’s mandated 
procedure for the creation of a commercial oil shale leasing program 
requires an understanding of NEPA generally, and NEPA’s requirement 
that the analysis of related actions be combined. 
A. The National Environmental Policy Act Generally 
 The purpose of NEPA is twofold: to ensure agencies consider the 
environmental impacts of their proposed actions early in the decision-
making process and to alert the public to the environmental impacts of 
proposed agency action.95 By requiring the consideration of environ-
mental impacts early in the agency decision-making process, NEPA en-
sures that agencies are aware of the environmental impacts of an action 
before they have committed to that action.96 Further, by announcing 
the environmental impacts of a proposed action early in the agency 
                                                                                                                      
91 See Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 241 (2006); EA, supra note 14, at 1.3. 
92 See EA, supra note 14, at 1.2. 
93 See EPAct 42 U.S.C. § 15927(d)(1). 
94 See NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c); EPAct, 42 U.S.C. § 15927(d)(1). 
95 The Supreme Court recently noted in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council that 
the purpose of NEPA’s environmental impact statement requirement is to ensure that 
“important [environmental] effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be 
discovered after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast,” and that “an 
agency has indeed considered environmental concerns . . . provides a springboard for 
public comment . . . [and] affords other affected governmental bodies notice of the ex-
pected consequences and the opportunity to plan and implement corrective measures in a 
timely manner.” 129 S. Ct. 365, 389–90 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
96 See id. at 389. 
2010] Setting Aside the BLM’s Oil Shale Rules and Regulations 203 
decision-making process, the public is able to act on that information 
through the administrative process before a decision is made.97 
 NEPA’s purpose is achieved through its Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) requirement.98 NEPA requires the preparation of an 
EIS for any proposed major federal action that will “significantly af-
fect[] the quality of the human environment.”99 An EIS is a public 
document that undertakes a detailed analysis of the following: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided 
should the proposal be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be 
implemented.100 
 An agency must follow the Council on Environmental Quality’s 
(CEQ) regulations to determine if an action they are proposing will 
trigger NEPA’s EIS requirement by having a significant effect on the en-
vironment.101 The CEQ regulations require the preparation of an Envi-
ronmental Assessment (EA) to make this determination unless the 
agency voluntarily decides to prepare an EIS or Congress has explicitly 
excluded the agency action from the EIS requirement.102 An EA is a 
“concise public document” that “[b]riefly provide[s] sufficient evidence 
and analysis for determining whether to prepare an environmental im-
pact statement.”103 If an agency determines through an EA that an EIS is 
not required, it must make a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) 
to accompany the agency’s final record of decision for the action.104 A 
                                                                                                                      
97 See id. at 389–90. 
98 See NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 
350 (1989). 
99 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
100 Id. § 4332(C)(i)–(v). 
101 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–18 (2009). Title II of NEPA established the CEQ, an agency 
responsible for the administration of NEPA. Daniel R. Mandelker et al., NEPA Law and 
Litigation § 2:8 (Paulette Simonetta & Nicole D’Alessandro eds., 2008). By executive 
order, the CEQ is specifically responsible for regulating the preparation of EISs. Id. 
102 See 40 C.F.R §§ 1508.4, .9; Mandelker et al. supra note 101, § 7:10.1. 
103 40 C.F.R § 1508.9(a). 
104 Id. § 1508.13. 
204 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 37:191 
FONSI “briefly present[s] the reasons why an action . . . will not have a 
significant effect on the human environment and for which an envi-
ronmental impact statement therefore will not be prepared.”105 
 Proposed agency actions requiring an EIS can be discrete individ-
ual actions or broad federal actions.106 An EIS for a broad federal action 
is called a PEIS.107 The purpose of a PEIS is to analyze the “cumulative 
or synergistic environmental impact[s]” of a proposed agency action on 
a region.108 The PEIS analyzes the broad environmental impacts of the 
implementation of a program in general, while more detailed site-
specific EISs analyze the implementation of a program in specific loca-
tions.109 The CEQ regulations specifically point to agency programs and 
regulations as broad federal actions that may require a PEIS.110 
 Finally, to be useful in making a decision about whether or not an 
EIS should be prepared, EAs are required to have the same “scope” as 
the potential EIS.111 Scope is simply the range of actions and alternatives 
considered in either the EIS or the EA.112 The remainder of this Note 
will deal mostly with inadequacies in the scope of EAs and EISs. Because 
the scope of EAs and EISs are the same, for the remainder of the Note, 
they will be referred to under a common name: “NEPA statements.” 
                                                                                                                      
105 Id. 
106 Id. § 1502.4(b). 
107 Mandelker et al. supra note 101, § 9:9 (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Appalachian 
Reg’l Comm’n, 677 F.2d 883, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citations and footnotes omitted)). One 
court described a PEIS as follows: 
A programmatic EIS reflects the broad environmental consequences atten-
dant upon a wide-ranging federal program. The thesis underlying program-
matic EISs is that a systematic program is likely to generate disparate yet re-
lated impacts. This relationship is expressed in terms of “cumulation” of 
impacts or “synergy” among impacts that are caused by or associated with var-
ious aspects of one big Federal action. Whereas the programmatic EIS looks 
ahead and assimilates “broad issues” relevant to one program design, the site-
specific EIS addresses more particularized considerations arising once the 
overall program reaches the “second tier,” or implementation stage of its de-
velopment. 
See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 677 F.2d at 888. 
108 Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976). 
109 Mandelker et al. supra note 101, § 9:9 (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 677 F.2d at 888). 
110 40 C.F.R § 1502.4(b). 
111 See id. § 1508.9(b). 
112 Id. § 1508.25. 
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B. The Administrative Procedure Act: NEPA’s Teeth 
 Due to the lack of a citizen-suit provision in NEPA, the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) is the sole method of citizen-enforcement of 
NEPA.113 In implementing NEPA, Congress assumed that the President 
would actively enforce its provisions.114 As a practical matter, however, 
the sole enforcement of NEPA comes from citizen plaintiffs acting 
through the APA’s citizen-suit provision.115 Under the APA, any final 
agency action can be set aside if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”116 This stan-
dard requires a court to “consider whether [an agency’s] decision [is] 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has 
been a clear error of judgment.”117 
 An agency is arbitrary and capricious in fulfilling its NEPA proce-
dural obligation if that agency fails to take a “hard look” at the envi-
ronmental consequences of the action it is proposing.118 The hard look 
must occur in fulfilling NEPA’s requirements which are procedural 
rather than substantive; NEPA mandates how an agency should make a 
decision rather than what decision an agency should make.119 As such, 
an agency can move forward with actions that may be environmentally 
imprudent, as long as they consider the environmental impacts of the 
action in an adequate NEPA statement.120 An agency takes a hard look 
when it identifies information that allows both the agency and the pub-
lic to evaluate the environmental impacts of the proposed action.121 An 
agency that fails to take a hard look at a proposed agency action is arbi-
trary and capricious in fulfilling its NEPA procedural requirement, and 
any action relying on that procedure must be set aside.122 
                                                                                                                      
113 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
114 Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, 
and Society 477–78 (3rd ed. 2004). 
115 See id. at 478. 
116 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
117 Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989) (quoting Citizens to 
Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)). 
118 See Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1114, 1140 (9th Cir. 
2008); Mandelker et al., supra note 101, § 3:7. 
119 See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 371; Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 
223, 227 (1980); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 
(1978); Conor O’Brien, Note, I Wish They All Could Be California Environmental Quality Acts: 
Rethinking NEPA in Light of Climate Change, 36 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 239, 248 (2009). 
120 See O’Brien, supra note 119, at 250. 
121 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989). 
122 See Or. Natural Desert Ass’n, 531 F.3d at 1140. 
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IV. NEPA Requires a Combined Analysis for Multiple Actions: 
The Segmentation Problem and the CEQ  
Regulation’s Solution 
 Segmenting a proposed action into many smaller actions for NEPA 
review can defeat NEPA’s purpose by minimizing the perceived envi-
ronmental impacts of the action.123 The Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) regulations prevent segmentation through mandating the 
combined analysis of smaller actions that are part of a larger proposed 
action, and proposed actions that are “connected,” “similar,” and/or 
have “cumulative impacts.”124 
A. Segmentation Generally 
 Segmentation is a means of circumventing NEPA’s purpose by divid-
ing larger agency actions into several smaller proposed actions for NEPA 
review.125 Segmentation minimizes the environmental consequences of a 
larger proposed action by dividing it into several proposals for analysis in 
separate NEPA statements.126 Thus, segmentation defeats NEPA’s dual 
purpose of requiring agencies to consider environmental impacts and 
disseminating information about environmental impacts to the public. 
This division of the analysis allows agencies to avoid confronting the to-
tality of the environmental impacts of their actions, and the piecemealed 
presentation of the information prevents the public from having a com-
plete understanding of the action’s environmental impacts.127 
B. The CEQ’s Regulatory Solution to the Segmentation Problem 
 To prevent segmentation, the CEQ regulations define the required 
“scope” of analysis for NEPA statements.128 The regulations require that 
a NEPA statement analyze the entirety, rather than a segment, of pro-
posed single actions.129 Further, the regulations require a single com-
bined analysis for proposed actions that are “similar,” “cumulative,” 
                                                                                                                      
123 See Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv., 297 F.3d 1012, 1028 
(10th Cir. 2002); Mandelker et al., supra note 101, § 9:11. 
124See Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 833, 842 (W.D. Mich. 1999) (describing sec-
tion 1508.25 of the CEQ Regulations as the regulatory incorporation of a judicially created 
prohibition on segmentation); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (2009). 
125 See Save Our Canyons, 297 F.3d at 1028; Mandelker et al., supra note 101, § 9:11. 
126 See Save Our Canyons, 297 F.3d at 1028; Mandelker et al., supra note 101, § 9:11. 
127 See Save Our Canyons, 297 F.3d at 1028. 
128 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25. 
129 See Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 893–94 (9th Cir. 2002); 40 
C.F.R. § 1502.4(a). 
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and/or “connected.”130 Thus, the analysis of whether multiple proposed 
actions should be included in the same NEPA statement proceeds in two 
parts: are the actions components of the same proposal and, if not and 
are the proposed actions similar, cumulative, or connected.131 
1. A NEPA Statement Must Analyze the Entirety of a Proposed Action 
 If an agency proposes a larger action that consists of many smaller 
agency actions, then all of the smaller actions must be analyzed in the 
same NEPA statement.132 However, for an action to require a NEPA 
statement an agency must propose it.133 A proposal for an action can 
either be made explicitly by an agency or a court can make a finding of 
fact that a proposed action exists.134 
 In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the Supreme Court required an explicit 
proposal.135 The question in Kleppe was whether a series of coal leases 
issued in the Northern Great Plains constituted a single proposed ac-
tion for a regional leasing program, thus requiring a single NEPA 
statement.136 The Court found that because the Department of the In-
terior had never explicitly made a “report or recommendation” for a 
regional leasing program, no proposal for such a program existed, and 
thus no combined NEPA statement was required.137 
 However, the explicit proposal requirement announced in Kleppe 
has been tempered by the subsequent CEQ regulations.138 These regu-
lations state that a proposal for an action can exist “in fact,” even if the 
agency has not made an explicit proposal.139 For a proposed action to 
exist under this standard, an agency must have a “goal” and be “actively 
preparing to make a decision on one or more alternative means of ac-
                                                                                                                      
130 See Dombeck, 304 F.3d at 893–94; Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 833, 842 (W.D. 
Mich. 1999) (describing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 as defining the “scope” of impact statements 
as the regulatory incorporation of a judicially created prohibition on segmentation); 40 
C.F.R. §§ 1502.4(a), .25. 
131 See Dombeck, 304 F.3d at 893 (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399 (1976)); 
40 C.F.R. § 1508.25. 
132 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a) (“Proposals or parts of proposals which are related to each 
other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in a single 
impact statement.”). 
133 Dombeck, 304 F.3d at 893 (citing Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 399). 
134 See Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 405–06; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23. 
135 Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 399. 
136 See id. at 395–96. 
137 Id. at 399. 
138 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23. 
139 See id. 
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complishing that goal.”140 Thus, in Blue Ocean Preservation Society v. Wat-
kins, the court looked to facts to determine whether the four stages of a 
geothermal energy project were a “single, integrated, action with a soli-
tary purpose[,] the construction of a 500 megawatt [power] plant,” or a 
series of discrete federal actions.141 Though each stage had been indi-
vidually proposed as a separate action for NEPA purposes, the court was 
willing to examine evidence to determine whether the separate actions 
were in fact a single action with a single goal.142 
2. Actions in Separate Proposals Requiring a Single NEPA Statement 
 The CEQ regulations require actions that are part of separate, 
concurrently pending proposals to be considered in the same NEPA 
statement if they are similar, cumulative, or connected.143 
a. Similar Actions 
 Multiple proposed actions that are similar must be analyzed in a 
combined NEPA statement.144 Similar proposed actions “have similari-
ties that provide a basis for evaluating their environmental conse-
quences [sic] together, such as common timing or geography.”145 How-
ever, this requirement is eviscerated by the considerable deference 
given agencies in determining if proposed actions are similar.146 The 
CEQ regulations state that an agency “may wish” to analyze “similar ac-
tions” in the same NEPA statement when a combined analysis is “the 
best way” to analyze the actions’ combined effects.147 Thus, in Klamath-
Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. Bureau of Land Management, the court de-
ferred to the agency’s decision that seemingly similar timber sales were 
                                                                                                                      
140 Id. 
141 Blue Ocean Pres. Soc’y v. Watkins, 754 F. Supp. 1450, 1456 (D. Haw. 1991). 
142 See id. 
143 See Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976)); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25; U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., BLM National Environmental Policy Act Hand-
book H–1790–1 § 6.5.2.1 to .3 (2008), available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/me- 
dialib/blm/wo/Information_Resources_Management/policy/blm_handbook.Par. 
24487.File.dat/h1790–1–2008–1.pdf [hereinafter BLM NEPA Handbook]. 
144 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3); BLM NEPA Handbook, supra note 143, § 6.5.2.3. 
145 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3). 
146 See Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d 989, 1000–
01 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 1291, 1305 (9th 
Cir. 2003)); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3). 
147 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3). 
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not similar.148 The timber sales were to be adjacent, located in the same 
watershed, harvested with identical methods, and supervised by the 
same personnel.149 Despite seemingly fitting the similar actions defini-
tion, the court found that it could not overturn the agency’s decision to 
analyze the sales in separate NEPA statements because it was up to the 
agency to determine the “best way” to evaluate the sales.150 
b. Cumulative Actions—Not Cumulative Impacts 
 Concurrently pending proposed actions that together have cumu-
lative environmental impacts must be evaluated in the same NEPA 
statement.151 A cumulative environmental impact is “the impact on the 
environment which results from the incremental impact of the action 
when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future 
actions.”152 In North Cascades Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 
several concurrent proposals for off-road vehicle trails were cumulative 
actions.153 This finding was based on each individual trail providing ac-
cess to a larger regional trail system and all of the proposals thus in-
crementally having combined environmental impacts on the region.154 
c. Connected Actions 
 The CEQ regulations give three definitions of connected actions 
that require combined NEPA statements: an action that “[a]utomatically 
trigger[s] other actions which may require environmental impact state-
ments”; an action that “[c]annot or will not proceed unless other ac-
tions are taken previously or simultaneously”; and actions that “[a]re 
                                                                                                                      
148 See Klamath-Siskiyou, 387 F.3d at 1000–01. 
149 Id. at 1001. 
150 See id. 
151 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(ii); BLM NEPA Handbook, supra note 143, § 6.5.2.2. 
Though decided before the promulgation of the superseding CEQ regulations, in Kleppe v. 
Sierra Club, the Supreme Court similarly expressed the need for cumulative actions to be 
considered in the same NEPA statement: “when several proposals for . . . actions that will 
have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are pending concur-
rently before an agency, their environmental consequences must be considered together. 
Only through comprehensive consideration of pending proposals can the agency evaluate 
different courses of action.” 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976) (footnotes omitted). 
152 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7, .25(c)(3). 
153 See N. Cascades Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 
1197, 1199 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
154 See id. at 1199. 
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interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action 
for their justification.”155 
 The first definition of connected action requires a combined 
NEPA analysis for concurrently pending proposed actions when one 
action “automatically trigger[s]” the other.156 For one action to auto-
matically trigger a second action, an agency must have no choice but to 
complete the second action after undertaking the first.157 Courts rarely 
find that a proposed action will automatically trigger a second action 
because agencies usually have some choice about undertaking the sec-
ond action, regardless of how limited or irrational that choice may 
seem. For example, in Piedmont Environmental Council v. Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, regulations allowing an agency to issue permits 
to build electric transmission lines did not automatically trigger the is-
suance of the permits themselves.158 The permits were not connected 
to the regulations because despite having the power to issue permits, 
the agency still could choose to reject each permit application.159 
 The second definition of connected action is less stringent, requir-
ing that proposed actions be considered in the same NEPA statement if 
one action “cannot or will not proceed” without the second action.160 
In a sense, the relationship between these actions is the reversal of the 
first definition: rather than one action having no choice but to proceed 
after the other, here one action cannot proceed without the other.161 A 
series of timber sale cases illustrate this requirement. In these cases, 
building a road to access timber and the actual timber sales were con-
nected actions requiring a single NEPA statement.162 The timber could 
not be removed without the roads, and the roads would not exist with-
out the need to access the timber.163 
 However, if one action can exist without the other, courts will not 
find that one action cannot or will not proceed without the other. In 
                                                                                                                      
155 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(i)–(iii). 
156 See id. § 1508.25(a)(1)(i). 
157 See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 558 F.3d 304, 316–
17 (4th Cir. 2009). 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
160 Citizens’ Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. U.S. Forest Serv., 297 F.3d 1012, 1029 
(10th Cir. 2002); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(ii). 
161 See Save Our Canyons, 297 F.3d at 1029. 
162 See Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 719–29 (9th Cir. 1988); Thomas v. 
Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 1985); Big Hole Ranchers Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
686 F. Supp. 256, 261–63 (D. Mont. 1988). 
163 See Save the Yaak, 840 F.2d at 719–20; Thomas, 753 F.2d at 758–59; Big Hole Ranchers, 
686 F. Supp. at 261–63. 
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Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Glickman, a radio antenna could exist 
without its access road.164 Despite facts seemingly similar to the timber 
cases, because the antenna could, and had for two years, existed with-
out the road, the antenna project could proceed without the road; 
therefore, it was not a connected action requiring a combined NEPA 
statement.165 Similarly, in Wilderness Workshop v. Bureau of Land Manage-
ment, a gas pipeline and proposed gas wells at the feeding end of the 
pipeline were not “connected actions.”166 Critical to the court’s deci-
sion was the fact that though the pipeline had far more capacity than 
the existing wells required, it could proceed without the construction 
of the proposed wells by servicing the existing wells.167 
 The third definition of connected action is the least restrictive. It 
requires multiple actions to be considered in the same NEPA statement 
if they are interdependent and justified by the same larger action.168 
For a larger action to justify a smaller action, the latter must simply be 
meant to facilitate the former: for example, a larger action may justify a 
stage in or segment of development.169 More frequently at controversy 
is the question of whether multiple actions are interdependent.170 
Unlike the second definition of a connected action, actions that are 
interdependent could exist without each other, but it would not be rea-
sonable or rational for an agency to undertake one action without the 
other.171 In Blue Ocean Preservation Society v. Watkins the assessment and 
testing stages that preceded the construction of a geothermal energy 
project met this third definition of connected action.172 Each stage laid 
the groundwork for the next, making all of the stages interdependent, 
while all of the stages relied on the construction of the final geother-
mal plant for their justification.173 
 This third definition of a connected action does not include mul-
tiple proposed actions that are justified by the same larger project, but 
                                                                                                                      
164 123 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 
165 Id. 
166 531 F.3d 1220, 1229–30 (10th Cir. 2008). 
167 See id. 
168 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(iii) (2009); BLM NEPA Handbook, supra note 143, 
§ 6.5.2.1. 
169 See Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Trout Unlimited v. 
Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974)); Fla. Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
401 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1313–17 (S.D. Fla. 2005); Shoshone-Paiute Tribe v. U.S., 889 F. Supp. 
1297, 1298 (D. Idaho 1994). 
170 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)(iii). 
171 See Blue Ocean Pres. Soc’y v. Watkins, 754 F. Supp. 1450, 1458–59 (D. Haw. 1991). 
172 See id. at 1452–53, 1458–59. 
173 Id. at 1458–59. 
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are not interdependent. In Utahns for Better Transportation v. U. S. De-
partment of Transportation, the court refused to find that three compo-
nents of a plan to relieve urban traffic congestion were connected be-
cause they were not interdependent.174 The three smaller projects—the 
expansion of a highway, the construction of a new highway, and the 
improvement of mass transit—were all justified by the larger traffic im-
provement project, but they were not interdependent because each 
smaller project did not rely on the others for its existence and each 
smaller project could relieve some traffic congestion on its own.175 
V. The BLM’s Approach to Its NEPA Procedural  
Requirement in Creating a Commercial  
Oil Shale Leasing Program 
 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) attempted to fulfill its 
mandate to create a commercial oil shale leasing program in three 
stages. First, it issued research, development, and demonstration (RDD) 
leases.176 Second, it amended twelve resource management plans 
(RMPs) for public land in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming to allow for oil 
shale leasing, and completed the programmatic environmental impact 
statement (PEIS) required by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) for 
analyzing that decision.177 Third, the BLM promulgated regulations for 
leasing public land for commercial oil shale development.178 
A. The Research Development and Demonstrations Leases 
 The BLM started issuing RDD leases before EPAct’s passage. No 
new authority was necessary to commence RDD leasing because the 
MLA provided the BLM the power to issue these leases, and certain 
tracts of public land were already available for the leasing.179 Thus, in 
anticipation of the August passage of the EPAct, the BLM began issuing 
RDD leases in June 2005.180 These leases are 160 acres each and give the 
lessees the option to reserve additional acreage surrounding their leases 
                                                                                                                      
174 305 F.3d 1152, 1161, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2002). 
175 Id. at 1183–84. 
176 PEIS, supra note 14, at 2-14. 
177 See id. at 1-3. 
178 Rules and Regulations: Oil Shale Management—General, 73 Fed. Reg. 69,414, 
69,414 (Nov. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3900). 
179 See Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 241 (2006); PEIS, supra note 14, at 1-16. 
180 Potential for Oil Shale Development; Call for Nominations—Oil Shale Research, De-
velopment and Demonstration (R, D & D) Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 33,753, 33,753 ( June 9, 
2005). 
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for later transformation into a commercial lease.181 Ultimately, the BLM 
issued six RDD leases.182 
 Environmental Assessments (EAs) were prepared for each of the 
leases, and in each case, the EA resulted in a record of decision including 
a finding of no significant impact (FONSI).183 Because the proposals for 
RDD leases were not concurrently pending with the proposals for the 
Resource Management Plan amendments and regulations, the BLM 
proceeded with separate NEPA statements for the RDD leasing ac-
tions.184 
B. The Resource Management Plan Amendments 
 Soon after the passage of the EPAct, the BLM published a notice 
announcing its intention to prepare a PEIS for a commercial leasing 
program on public lands.185 The notice was explicit that the PEIS would 
analyze both the amendment of RMPs necessary to open public land for 
commercial leasing and the creation of regulations for the new pro-
gram.186 However, the draft PEIS that was issued two years later only ad-
dressed the amendment of RMPs in Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming.187 
 The sole purpose of the PEIS was to analyze the amendment of 
RMPs to allow commercial oil shale leasing.188 RMPs are regional com-
prehensive planning documents for public land administered by the 
Department of the Interior.189 They incorporate all plans and proce-
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dures for public land in a particular region into one planning docu-
ment.190 In order for the BLM to undertake a particular action or pro-
gram on a piece of public land, authorization for that action or pro-
gram must first be included in the RMP.191 For example, the White 
River RMP, addressing public land located in Rio Blanco County, Colo-
rado, governs the management of water resources, mineral resources, 
oil and gas, hazardous waste, vegetation, forestry, livestock, wild horses, 
cultural resources, wild fires, and more.192 Because amending an RMP 
is often considered a proposed federal action that could significantly 
affect the environment, a NEPA statement will usually be included in 
the amendment process.193 To facilitate this, the RMP amendment 
process parallels the timeline for preparing a NEPA statement.194 To 
open public land for commercial leasing, the RMP covering that public 
land has to be amended.195 
 The final version of the oil shale PEIS amended twelve RMPs.196 
Though encompassing over 1000 pages, the PEIS limits its scope to ana-
lyzing the decision to amend the RMPs.197 The PEIS also states that it 
does not analyze the oil shale regulations that are also required by the 
EPAct because the regulations involve different issues, are on a differ-
ent schedule, and would be better analyzed through a separate NEPA 
statement.198 The BLM published a record of decision for the twelve 
RMP amendments on November 17, 2008.199 The RMP amendments 
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were executed sixty days later on January 16, 2009, just four days before 
Barack Obama took office.200 
C. The Oil Shale Regulations 
 No action was taken by the BLM to promulgate the oil shale regu-
lations required by EPAct until July 2008, when it published proposed 
oil shale regulations in the Federal Register.201 The notice proposing 
the regulations did not mention the EA that the BLM had prepared to 
analyze whether the regulations triggered NEPA’s EIS requirement.202 
This EA is limited in scope to only the regulations; it does not include 
an analysis of RMP amendments.203 The narrow scope of the EA led to 
a finding that no EIS was required.204 The BLM justified its finding on 
its claim that the creation of regulations that mandate leasing proce-
dures does not force the BLM to actually issue leases.205 From the 
BLM’s point of view, the choice to issue leases was retained.206 Thus, 
according to the BLM, though issuing a lease could have a significant 
environmental impact, the regulations themselves had no significant 
impact on the environment.207 
 The process for creating the EA was not as transparent as the 
preparation of the other NEPA statements implementing EPAct’s 
Commercial Oil Shale Program. Unlike the other NEPA statements, the 
EA is not available on the internet. To obtain the EA, it must be specifi-
cally requested from the BLM’s Washington, DC office.208 The BLM’s 
first mention of the EA is in passing in the November 18, 2008 record 
of decision that contained the final regulations; one day before the 
publication of the RMP amendment’s record of decision.209 The regu-
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lations became final—also similar to the RMP amendments—just three 
days before Barack Obama took office.210 
VI. A Single NEPA Statement Is Required 
 A court would likely find that the BLM’s failure to prepare a single 
NEPA statement for the resource management plan (RMP) amendments 
and the oil shale regulations is arbitrary and capricious; therefore, both 
decisions should be set aside. The BLM failed to take a hard look at the 
environmental consequences of either action by too narrowly defining 
the scope of each action to not include the other.211 The failure to take a 
hard look should be sufficient to find that both actions were arbitrary 
and capricious; therefore, a reviewing court should set aside the NEPA 
statements for the RMP amendments and the oil shale regulations.212 
 A single NEPA statement could be required for two reasons: First, 
the RMP amendments and the regulations should have been consid-
ered as parts of a single proposed federal action—the creation of a 
commercial oil shale leasing program.213 Second, if the RMP amend-
ments and the regulations are separate proposed actions, they could 
still be similar, cumulative, or connected actions.214 
A. A Single Proposed Action 
 The RMP amendments and regulations could be considered part 
of a single proposal for a major federal action. A single proposal could 
occur in two ways: if the BLM explicitly proposed a larger action that 
included both the RMP amendments and the regulations; or if a fact 
determination can be made that the BLM, though not explicitly, has a 
goal for completing an action that includes the RMP amendments and 
regulations and the BLM is actively pursuing that goal.215 
 The BLM has not explicitly proposed an action that includes both 
the RMP amendments and the regulations.216 Under Kleppe’s strict for-
mulation, the BLM would have to explicitly propose a single program 
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of which both smaller actions are a part.217 To the contrary, in both the 
EA for the regulations and the PEIS for the RMP amendments, the 
BLM is explicit that it is recommending only a single action; neither 
document claims to be implementing a program that includes both 
actions.218 For example, in the EA, the BLM states: 
[T]he BLM concurrently proposed regulations for public re-
view and comment while the requisite PEIS [for the RMP 
amendments] was being prepared. However, the BLM rule-
making process is separate and apart from the preparation of 
the PEIS with its own environmental documentation. The 
PEIS analyzes the environmental consequences of an alloca-
tion decision, while this EA analyzes the regulatory framework 
for the administration of an oil shale program.219 
 However, a court could consider the RMP amendments and the 
regulations to be part of the same proposed action under the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations’ less restrictive definition.220 
This definition requires that the BLM has a goal including both actions 
and is actively pursuing that goal.221 As in Blue Ocean Preservation Society 
v. Watkins, a fact determination could show the existence of a proposed 
action, despite the absence of an explicit proposal for that action by the 
BLM.222 There, the court was willing to look to evidence to determine 
whether the stages of a power plant project were in fact all part of a sin-
gle project, the planning and construction of the power plant.223 
 Similarly, here the BLM has the goal of creating a commercial oil 
shale leasing program. The most obvious evidence of this is the EPAct’s 
statutory mandate.224 The EPAct requires the creation of a commercial 
leasing program occur through the creation of a PEIS and the promul-
gation of regulations.225 The BLM created the PEIS and promulgated 
the regulations, and in both instances was explicit that it was adhering 
to the EPAct’s statutory mandate: In the EA, the BLM states that “it pre-
pared regulations to implement Section 369 of the [EPAct].”226 In the 
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PEIS, the BLM states that its purpose is to fulfill the EPAct’s mandate to 
“complete a programmatic environmental impact statement for com-
mercial leasing on public lands.”227 
 Furthermore, the BLM is explicit that the RMP amendments and 
the regulations are integral parts of achieving the goal of creating a 
commercial oil shale leasing program stating, “[I]n order for a commer-
cial leasing program to occur on public lands, the [RMPs] for the areas 
where the leasing could occur must be amended.”228 Similarly, the BLM 
states that the regulations “will implement the [EPAct’s] statutory re-
quirement for establishing a program to support oil shale produc-
tion.”229 
B. Similar, Cumulative, or Connected Actions 
 If the RMP amendments and the regulations are not part of the 
same proposed action, they would not be similar or cumulative actions, 
but should be considered connected actions under the CEQ regula-
tions, thus requiring analysis in the same NEPA statement. 
1. Similar Actions 
 The RMP amendments and regulations are not similar actions. 
Similar actions “have similarities that provide a basis for evaluating their 
environmental consequences [sic] together, such as common timing or 
geography.”230 The RMP amendments and regulations accomplish two 
very different objectives. The RMP amendments open public land for 
commercial oil shale leasing, and the regulations establish the proce-
dures for commercial oil shale leasing.231 Alternatively, in defining simi-
lar actions, the CEQ regulations contemplate actions that accomplish 
similar goals through similar actions.232 
 Even if there were a finding that the RMP amendments and the 
regulations are similar actions, that would not be enough to require a 
combined statement. The CEQ regulations give the BLM discretion to 
analyze similar actions in separate NEPA statements if that is the “best 
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way” to undertake the analysis.233 Because of this discretion, as with the 
seemingly similar actions in Klamath-Siskiyou, a court would likely defer 
to the agency in its decision of whether to prepare a combined NEPA 
analysis.234 The lack of similarity in fact, and the discretion afforded the 
BLM, make it unlikely that the RMP amendments and the regulations 
would be required to be analyzed in the same NEPA statement as similar 
actions.235 
2. Cumulative Actions 
 The RMP amendments and the regulations are also likely not cu-
mulative actions requiring a single NEPA statement.236 In order to be 
cumulative actions, the RMP amendments and the regulations would 
have to have cumulative impacts.237 To have cumulative impacts, sepa-
rate actions must have a minimal incremental effect, but when com-
bined have a significant impact on the environment.238 For example, in 
Northern Cascades Conservation Council v. U.S. Forest Service, off-road vehi-
cle trails had a much smaller impact when analyzed in isolation then 
when analyzed with the other proposed trails that were all connected to 
the same regional network.239 Unlike off-road vehicle trails, here the 
RMP amendments and the regulations do not share cumulative im-
pacts.240 The regulations will be applied to the land opened for leasing 
by the RMP amendments, but the environmental impacts of each do 
not incrementally add to the other action’s impacts.241 This lack of 
shared cumulative impacts will prevent the two actions from being con-
sidered cumulative actions requiring a combined NEPA statement.242 
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3. Connected Actions 
 The RMP amendments and the regulations are likely connected 
actions requiring the preparation of a single NEPA statement.243 The 
two actions could fit all three of the CEQ’s definitions for a connected 
action: (1) an action that “[a]utomatically trigger[s] other actions which 
may require environmental impact statements”; (2) an action that 
“[c]annot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken previously 
or simultaneously”; and (3) actions that “[a]re interdependent parts of a 
larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification.”244 
 At first blush, the two actions do not appear to meet the first defi-
nition of a connected action, but an action-forcing mandate in the 
EPAct changes this.245 To fit the first definition, the decision to amend 
the RMPs would have to “automatically trigger” the decision to prom-
ulgate the regulations or vice versa.246 Generally speaking, the RMP 
amendment decision to open public land for lease applications could 
not be considered as “automatically triggering” the decision to create 
regulations for leasing. The situation is analogous to Piedmont Environ-
mental Council v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, where the decision 
to create permitting procedures did not automatically trigger the issu-
ance of the permits because the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion retained the choice to grant or deny any permit applications.247 
Similarly here, the BLM generally does not have to create leasing regu-
lations just because it opens public lands for potential leasing.248 
 However, the added statutory obligation of the EPAct creates a 
unique set of circumstances where the RMP amendments automatically 
trigger the leasing regulations.249 The EPAct requires that the BLM issue 
the oil shale regulations six months after the completion of the PEIS.250 
According to the BLM, the purpose of the PEIS is to analyze the deci-
sion to amend the RMP amendments.251 Once the BLM decided to 
amend the twelve RMPs, Congress required the BLM to promulgate the 
leasing regulations within six months.252 The BLM’s decision to amend 
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the RMPs required it to subsequently promulgate regulations; therefore, 
the two actions should be considered connected, requiring a single 
NEPA statement.253 
 The RMP amendments and the regulations also likely fit the sec-
ond definition of a connected action.254 This definition requires that if 
one proposed action cannot or will not proceed without another action, 
the two actions must be considered together in the same NEPA state-
ment.255 Here, if the completion of one action requires the completion 
of the other, then the two actions are connected and must be examined 
in the same NEPA statement.256 For example, in Thomas v. Peterson, tim-
ber sales were awaiting approval to build a logging road to access the 
sales.257 The timber sales could not occur without the approval of the 
logging road and therefore the two actions were connected.258 
 Similar to the previous definition of connected, the EPAct provides 
context that fulfills this definition, thus requiring a combined NEPA 
statement for the RMP amendments and the regulations.259 Absent the 
EPAct, the BLM could proceed with either action without the other. 
Promulgating regulations for leasing does not require that land be 
available for leasing and making land available for leasing does not re-
quire regulations to undertake the leasing. However, the structure of the 
EPAct appears to create this relationship.260 The EPAct requires that the 
BLM examine a commercial leasing program in the PEIS and then im-
plement the program with the regulations.261 If the regulations are im-
plementing what is analyzed in the PEIS—the RMP amendments—then 
the regulations could not proceed before the completion of the PEIS. 
The reliance of one action on the other for its existence makes the two 
actions connected, requiring the preparation of a single NEPA state-
ment.262 
 Finally, the RMP amendments likely fit the third definition of a 
connected action.263 For two actions to be connected under this defini-
tion, they must be both justified by the same larger action and be inter-
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dependent parts of that larger action.264 To be interdependent, it must 
not be reasonable to consider undertaking one action without the 
other.265 In Blue Ocean Society v. Watkins, the assessment and testing stages 
that preceded the construction of a geothermal energy project satisfied 
both regulatory conditions.266 Each stage laid the groundwork for the 
next, making them interdependent, while all of the stages relied on the 
construction of the final geothermal plant for their justification.267 
 The RMP amendments and the regulations are both justified by 
the creation of a commercial oil shale leasing program.268 Like the 
stages in creating the geothermal energy project in Blue Ocean Society, 
the EPAct is explicit that the RMP amendments and the regulations are 
steps toward creating a commercial oil shale leasing program;269 the 
RMP amendments open land for leasing and the regulations create the 
procedure for that leasing.270 The BLM frames the actions similarly: It 
frames the RMP amendments as the allocation decision for what land 
can be used in an oil shale program.271 It frames the regulations as the 
“framework for the administration of an oil shale program.”272 
 The two actions are also interdependent. The requirements of the 
EPAct make it irrational and unreasonable to pursue the regulations 
without the RMP amendments.273 The EPAct requires the BLM to ana-
lyze the commercial leasing program in the PEIS and then implement 
that program through regulations.274 The regulations are thus meant to 
implement what the BLM analyzed in the PEIS: the RMP amendments. 
It would be unreasonable or irrational for the BLM to violate the EPAct 
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by creating regulations for a commercial oil shale program before it 
analyzed the program in the PEIS.275 Because the RMP amendments 
are interdependent parts of, and justified by, the larger commercial 
leasing program, the two actions are connected and must be analyzed 
in the same NEPA statement.276 
Conclusion 
 A commercial oil shale leasing program on public lands may or 
may not be a good idea. However, the BLM should not rush forward 
with a commercial oil shale leasing program without a better under-
standing of its potential environmental impacts. The current Interior 
Secretary and the governors of Colorado and Wyoming have been ex-
plicit to that effect.277 In order to ensure that a responsible leasing pro-
gram is put in place, the program rushed into effect by the Bush Ad-
ministration must first be repealed. 
 A finding by a court that the RMP amendments and the regula-
tions governing the lease program should have been considered in the 
same NEPA statement would have this effect. Such a finding would 
mean that the BLM failed in its NEPA procedural obligation and that 
the two actions taken must be set aside until that obligation is met. This 
would remove the rule and regulations without counting on the 
unlikely prospect of Secretary Salazar undertaking the time and re-
source-consuming administrative repeal process. Once the rule and 
regulations are set aside, the Secretary can focus on moving forward 
cautiously in examining the merits of a potential commercial oil shale 
leasing program. 
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